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Abstract: Existing anomaly and intrusion detection schemes of wireless sensor networks
have mainly focused on the detection of intrusions. Once the intrusion is detected, an alerts
or claims will be generated. However, any unidentiﬁed malicious nodes in the network could
send faulty anomaly and intrusion claims about the legitimate nodes to the other nodes. Veri-
fying the validity of such claims is a critical and challenging issue that is not considered in the
existing cooperative-based distributed anomaly and intrusion detection schemes of wireless
sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a validation algorithm that addresses this prob-
lem. This algorithm utilizes the concept of intrusion-aware reliability that helps to provide
adequate reliability at a modest communication cost. In this paper, we also provide a security
resiliency analysis of the proposed intrusion-aware alert validation algorithm.
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1. Introduction
Many anomaly and intrusion detection schemes (IDS) have been proposed for wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) [1–6], but those schemes mainly focus on the detection of malicious or faulty nodes.
All those anomaly and intrusion detection schemes (IDS) that are cooperative in nature [1, 2, 4] need
to share anomalies or intrusion claims with the other node(s). However, those schemes are unable to
ascertain that the alert or claim received by the other node(s) is in fact sent by the trusted node(s). As a
result, any unidentiﬁed malicious node(s) in the network could send faulty anomaly and intrusion claims
about the legitimate node(s) to the other node(s). Verifying the validity of such claims is a critical issue
that is not considered in existing cooperative-based distributed anomaly and IDS schemes of WSNs [7].
Recently, some intrusion prevention schemes that are based on alerts have been proposed in the litera-
ture [8, 9]. However, these schemes are based on the assumption that the monitoring nodes are trusted
or the claim will be trusted if the monitoring node passed simple authentication and integrity test based
on shared pair-wise key.
In this paper, we propose a new intrusion-aware alert validation algorithm that provides a mechanism
for verifying anomaly and intrusion claims sent by any unidentiﬁed malicious node(s). This algorithm
is simple and easy to implement. Our proposed algorithm execute on alert sender monitoring nodes and
alert receiver monitoring nodes. Sender monitoring nodes are mainly responsible for the detection of
malicious nodes, assignment of threat level, and generation of alert messages, whereas receiver moni-
toring nodes are mainly responsible for the validation of alert messages. Validation mechanism consists
of two phases: consensus phase and decision phase. Although the consensus approach is widely used
in distributed computing domain to solve many problems like fault-tolerance [10], here we used this ap-
proach with variation to solve problem of trusting anomaly and intrusion claims. In consensus phase, we
uniquely introduce an intrusion-aware reliability concept that helps to provide an adequate reliability at
a modest communication cost. In the decision phase, a node will make the decision regarding validation
and invalidation of a claim based on the result of consensus phase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains description on taxonomy of IDS.
Section 3 describes related work. Section 4 discusses the network model, assumptions and deﬁnitions.
Section 5 describes the proposed validation algorithm. Section 6 provides the analysis and evaluation
of proposed algorithm in terms of communication overhead, reliability and security. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper and highlights some future work.
2. Taxonomy of IDS
From the classiﬁcation point of view, IDS have often been categorized into two types: signature-
based IDS and anomaly-based IDS as shown in Figure 1. The signature-based IDS schemes (mostly
implemented via pattern matching approach) detect intrusions based on the attack’s signature, such as,
speciﬁc byte sequence in the payload or speciﬁc information in the header ﬁelds like sender address,
last hop address, etc. On the other hand, the anomaly-based IDS (mostly implemented via statistical
approach), ﬁrst determines the normal network activity and then checks all trafﬁc that deviates from the
normal and marks it as anomalous.Sensors 2009, 9 5991
In order to strengthen the signature-based and anomaly-based IDS schemes, some researchers applied
heuristic algorithms. Heuristic approaches are generally used in AI. Instead of looking for exact pattern
matches or simple thresholds, heuristic-based IDS “looks for behavior that is out of ordinary” [11] during
speciﬁc time interval. In simple words, it “uses an algorithm to determine whether an alarm should be
ﬁred” [12]. For example, if a threshold number of unique ports are scanned on a particular host or a
speciﬁc attack pattern signature is detected, then alarm will be ﬁred [12].
Figure 1. Taxonomy of intrusion detection schemes.
From an architectural point of view, IDS schemes are further categorized into three categories: cen-
tralized, distributed and hybrid. In the centralized approach, a single designated node monitors the whole
network. In the distributed approach, every node or a group of nodes monitor the network. In the hybrid
approach, every group has one selected primary node responsible for monitoring and detecting anoma-
lies and intrusions. Once the information is gathered, it is forwarded to the central base station which
calculates the impact of those anomalies and intrusions on the whole network.
From the potency point of view, distributed approach is further classiﬁed into cooperative and unco-
operative distributed approaches. In the cooperative distributed approach, every node or a group of nodes
exchanges information about the anomalies and intrusions in order to detect collaborative intrusion at-
tacks. On the contrary, in the uncooperative distributed approach, nodes do not share information about
anomalies and intrusion with each others.
3. Related Work
3.1. Intrusion Detection Schemes
Intrusion detection schemes are not in itself the main focus of this paper. However, in order to give
a brief overview of those, we have summarized the existing proposed anomalies and IDS schemes of
WSNs in Table 1, in which [1, 2, 4, 6] are distributed and cooperative in nature. Brief descriptions of
some of the proposed schemes are given below.
Bhuse et al. [1] have proposed different lightweight techniques for detecting anomalies for various
layers, such as application, network, MAC and physical. The main advantage of the proposed techniques
is the low overhead that makes them energy efﬁcient. This is due to the fact that they reuse the alreadySensors 2009, 9 5992
available system information (e.g., RSSI values, round trip time, etc.) which are brought forth at various
layers of network stack.
Table 1. Summarization of proposed Anomalies and IDS schemes of WSNs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Technique Signature-based Statistical-based Statistical-based Statistical-based Statistical-based Statistical-based
Classiﬁcation Architecture Distributed &
cooperative
Distributed &
cooperative
Distributed &
uncooperative Hybrid Distributed &
uncooperative
Distributed &
cooperative
Installation of
IDS
Each sensor
node
Each sensor
node
Each sensor
node
Each primary
nodeofagroup
Special mon-
itor nodes in
network
Each sensor
node
Speciﬁcations IDSScope
Multilayer
(Appl., Net.,
MAC&Phy.)
Application
layer Networklayer Application
layer
Multilayer
(Appl., Net.,
MAC&Phy.)
Networklayer
Attacksdetects
Masquerade at-
tack, and forged
packetsattacks
Localization
anomalies
Routing attacks
e.g.,Periodicer-
ror route attack,
active & passive
sinkholeattack
Correlated
anomalies /
attacks (invalid
datainsertion)
Wormhole,data
alteration,selec-
tive forwarding,
black hole, &
jamming
Routing attacks
e.g., packet
droppingetc.
Network Sensornode Static/Mobile Static Static/Mobile Static/Mobile Static Static
Topology Any Any Any Cluster-based Tree-based Any
Chatzigiannakis et al. [4] have proposed an application level anomaly detection approach that fuses
data (comprised of multiple metrics) gathered from different sensor nodes. In the proposed scheme, the
authors have applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensionality of a data set.
So this approach will help to detect correlated anomalies/attacks that involve multiple groups of sensors.
Du et al. [2] have proposed a localization anomalies detection (LAD) scheme for the wireless sensor
networks. This scheme takes the advantage of the deployment knowledge and the group membership of
its neighbors, available in many sensor network applications. This information is then utilized to ﬁnd
out whether the estimated location is consistent with its observations. In case of an inconsistency LAD
would report an anomaly.
Loo et al. [3] have proposed an anomaly based intrusion detection scheme that is used to detect
network level intrusions, e.g., routing attacks. They use clustering algorithm to build the model of
normal network behavior, and then use this model to detect anomalies in trafﬁc patterns. IDS will be
installed on each sensor and each IDS will function independently.
Da Silva et al. [5] have proposed high level methodology to construct the decentralized IDS for
wireless sensor networks. They have adopted statistical approach based on the inference of the network
behavior. The network behavior is obtained from the analysis of the events detected at the speciﬁc
monitor node, which is responsible for monitoring its one-hop neighbors looking for intruder(s).
Liu et al. [6] have proposed insider attack detection scheme for wireless sensor networks. They have
adopted localized distributed and cooperative approach. This scheme explores the spatial correlation
in neighborhood activities and requires no prior knowledge about normal or malicious nodes. This
scheme works in four phases: (1) collection of local information about neighborhood nodes (e.g., packet
dropping rate, sending rate, etc.), (2) ﬁltering the collected data, (3) identiﬁcation of initial outlyingSensors 2009, 9 5993
(malicious) nodes, and (4) applying majority vote to obtain a ﬁnal list of malicious nodes. Once the node
detects some malicious node, it will forward the report to the base station. Afterwards the base station
will isolate that node from the network.
3.2. Intrusion Prevention Schemes
Su et al. [8] have proposed an energy-efﬁcient Hybrid Intrusion Prohibition (eHIP) system for cluster-
based wireless sensor networks. The eHIP system consists of two subsystems: Authentication-based
Intrusion Prevention (AIP) subsystem and Collaboration-based Intrusion Detection (CID) subsystem.
In AIP, two distinguish authentication mechanisms are proposed to verify the control and sensed data
messages with the help of HMAC and the modiﬁed form of one-key chain [13] mechanisms. CID is
also consisted of two subsystems: cluster head monitoring (CHM) system and member node monitoring
(MNM) system. In CHM, all member nodes are divided into multiple monitoring groups. With respect
to security requirements, each monitoring group has various number of monitoring nodes. Every moni-
toring group monitors the cluster head. Whenever any monitoring group detects malicious activity of the
cluster head, it generates an alarm that is forwarded to all member nodes of the cluster. Each member
node maintains the alarm table. If the number of alarms exceeds then the alarm threshold, the cluster
head will be declared as a malicious node. The member node monitoring mechanism is performed at the
cluster head and limited to the detection of compromised nodes through the used pair-wise key only.
Zhang et al. [9] have proposed a nice application-independent framework for identifying compro-
mised nodes. This framework is based on alerts generated by speciﬁc intrusion detection system. The
authors have adopted a centralized approach and used a simple graph theory. However, this scheme
has some limitations, e.g., it provides some late detection of compromised nodes, because the detection
process will always start at the end of each time window. If the size of the time window is large (e.g.,
one hour, as mentioned in [9]), then it is very likely that an adversary can achieve its objective during
that time window. If the time window is small, then the result may not be accurate. Also, the detection
accuracy is mainly dependent on the size of the network density. If the network size decreases, then the
detection accuracy will also decrease.
4. Network Model, Assumptions and Deﬁnitions
4.1. Network Model and Assumptions
Sensor nodes are deployed in an environment either in a random fashion or in a grid fashion. After de-
ployment nodes become static, nodes are organized into clusters. The reason behind taking cluster-based
network model is that it is widely used in real world scenarios for efﬁcient network organization [14].
Within a cluster, communication mechanism could be single-hop [15] or multi-hop [16]. In case of a
multi-hop clustering environment, the cluster could be divided into two or three sensor sub-clusters for
the purpose of distributed detection [17].
We assume that any cooperative-based distributed anomaly detection or IDS is already deployed in
the WSNs and forwards claims to the other node(s) whenever it detects anomalies or intrusions. Based
on the mechanism of the IDS, every node or subset of nodes (within a cluster) acts as a monitoring node.
The malicious node must fall into the radio range of the monitoring node. And the node (who receivedSensors 2009, 9 5994
the claim from the monitoring node) has the knowledge about the neighboring nodes of the monitoring
and malicious nodes (the malicious and monitoring nodes belong to the same cluster). Within a cluster
or sub-cluster, all monitoring nodes can communicate with each other directly. We also assume that the
multiple sensor nodes in a neighborhood can sense the same anomaly/intrusion. We also assume that all
information is exchanged in a secure encrypted manner. For this purpose, every monitoring node share
a unique secret key [18] with other monitoring node(s) that are in the same cluster.
4.2. Deﬁnitions
A legitimate node compromised by an adversary is called a malicious node. In order to hide the
presence of the adversary, a malicious node could also perform all activities of the normal nodes, such
as monitoring, ciphering of data, forwarding of packets, etc.
Reliability means the conﬁdence level on a certain decision. It can simply be categorized into three
levels: (1) low, (2) medium, and (3) high. At low reliability, validation is based on the conﬁrmation from
any single available trusted source. At medium reliability, validation is based on the conﬁrmation from
half of the available trusted sources. At high reliability, validation is based on the conﬁrmation from all
of the trusted sources. In general, the reliability level (RL) is deﬁne as:
RL = q ; q · n (1)
where n represents the total number of available trusted nodes, and q represents the number of nodes
consulted. However, in order to achieve more ﬂexibility and adaptability, we have adopted the intrusion-
aware reliability mode concept, in which the validation is based on the level of a threat of an anomaly or
intrusion. This approach will also reduce the communication cost as described in Section 6.1. Threats
could also be categorizedinto low, medium, high or other. Depending on the level of the threat, intrusion-
aware reliability mode is set to low, medium, high or other, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Intrusion-aware reliability mode concept.
5. Intrusion-aware Alert Validation Algorithm
Our proposed intrusion-aware alert validation algorithm execute on sender as well as on receiver
monitoring nodes. Sender monitoring nodes are mainly responsible for the detection of malicious
nodes and generation of alert messages, whereas receiver monitoring nodes are mainly responsibleSensors 2009, 9 5995
for the validation of alert messages. Both sender and receiver nodes go through different phases as
described below.
5.1. Sender Monitoring Node
In our proposed algorithm, sender monitoring node will perform mainly three steps (as shown in
Figure 3): (1) detection of malicious node, (2) threat level assignment, and (3) generation of
alert message.
Figure 3. Intrusion-aware validation algorithm at sender end.
Phase 1: Detection of Malicious Node
A node can be classiﬁed into one of the three categories [19]: trustworthy, untrustworthy, and uncer-
tain. A node is considered to be trustworthy if it interacts successfully most of the time with the other
nodes. A node is considered untrustworthy if it tries to do as many unsuccessful interactions as possible
with the other nodes. An untrustworthy node could be a faulty [20] or malicious node. A node is con-
sidered uncertain if it performs both successful and unsuccessful interactions. Detailed deﬁnition of the
successful and unsuccessful interactions and trust calculation methodology is available in our paper [21]
and provided here in a simpliﬁed form.
A sender will consider an interaction successful if the sender receives conﬁrmation that the packet
is successfully received by the neighbor node and forwarded towards the destination in an unaltered
fashion. The ﬁrst requirement of successful reception is achieved on the reception of the link layer
acknowledgment (ACK). The second requirement of forwarding towards the destination is achieved
with the help of enhanced passive acknowledgment (PACK) by overhearing the transmission of a next
hop on the route, since they are within the radio range [22]. If the sender node does not overhear the
retransmission of the packet within a threshold time from its neighboring node or the overheard packet isSensors 2009, 9 5996
found to be illegally fabricated (by comparing the payload that is attached to the packet), then the sender
node will consider that interaction as unsuccessful.
With the help of this simple approach, several attacks can be prevented, i.e., the black hole attack
is straightforwardly detected when malicious node drops the incoming packets and keeps sending self-
generated packets [23]. Similarly, sink hole attack [24], an advanced version of the black hole attack,
is also easily detectable by looking at the passive acknowledgment. Likewise, the selective forwarding
attack [25] and gray-hole attack [26] can also be eliminated with the aid of above mentioned approach.
Based on these successful and unsuccessful interactions, node x can calculate the trust value of
node y:
Tx;y =
·
100
µ
Sx;y
Sx;y + Ux;y
¶µ
1 ¡
1
Sx;y + 1
¶¸
(2)
where [.] is the nearest integer function, Sx;y is the total number of successful interactions of node x with
y during time ¢t, Ux;y is the total number of unsuccessful interactions of node x with y during time ¢t.
After calculating trust value, a node will quantize trust into three states as follows:
Mp(Tx;y) =
8
> <
> :
trustworthy 100 ¡ f · Tx;y · 100
uncertain 50 ¡ g · Tx;y < 100 ¡ f
untrustworthy 0 · Tx;y < 50 ¡ g
9
> =
> ;
(3)
where, f represents half of the average values of all trustworthy nodes and g represents one-third of the
average values of all untrustworthy nodes. Both f and g are calculated as follows:
fj+1 =
( h
1
2
³P
i2Rx Tx;i
jRxj
´i
0 < jRxj · n ¡ 1
fj jRxj = 0
(4)
gj+1 =
( h
1
3
³P
i2Mx Tx;i
jMxj
´i
0 < jMxj · n ¡ 1
gj jMxj = 0
(5)
where [.] is the nearest integer function, Rx represents the set of trustworthy nodes for node x, Mx
the set of untrustworthy nodes for node x, and n is the total number of nodes that contains trustworthy,
untrustworthy and uncertain nodes. The initial trust values of all nodes are 50, which represents the
uncertain state. Initially f and g are equal to 25 and 17 respectively, although other values could also
be used by keeping the following constraint intact: fi ¡ gi ¸ 1, which is necessary for keeping the
uncertain zone between a trusted and untrustworthy zone. The values of f and g are adaptive. During
thesteady-stateoperation, thesevaluescanchangewitheverypassingunitoftimewhichcreatesdynamic
trust boundaries. At any stage, when jRxj or jMxj becomes zero, the value of fj+1 or gj+1 remains the
same as the previous values (fj and gj). The nodes whose values are above 100 ¡ f will be declared
as trustworthy nodes (Equation 3), and nodes whose values are lower than 50 ¡ g will be consider as
untrustworthy nodes (Equation 3). After each passage of time, ¢t, nodes will recalculate the values of
f and g. This trust calculation procedure will continue in this fashion.
The time window length (¢t) could be made shorter or longer based on the network analysis sce-
narios. If ¢t is too short, then the calculated trust value may not reﬂect the reliable behavior. On the
other hand, if it is too long, then it will consume too much memory to store the interaction record at the
sensor node. Therefore, various paremters can be used to adjust the length of ¢t. In simplicity, let usSensors 2009, 9 5997
assume a cluster size, n, as the single paramters; then, ¢t is equal to n ¡ 1. This approach reduces the
problems associated with too short or too long time window lengths. Moreover, the time window lengths
are adaptive based on the cluster size. If the size of the cluster changes, then the time window length will
also change.
Phase 2: Threat Level Assignment
Wheneveramonitoringnodedetectsmaliciousnode, itgeneratesanalert. Thisalertwillbeforwarded
to the other neighbor monitoring nodes. In our proposed algorithm, an alert message also contains the
information about intensity or level of threat. This level of threat is calculated based on the trust value
of the malicious node. The lesser the trust value, the higher the threat level. For example, if a node
is continuously dropping all incoming packets (black hole attack), then based on the trust management
methodology deﬁned above, the trust value of a malicious node becomes zero. So, the level of threat for
this kind of attack is high. If a node is performing sink hole attack, then the trust value of a node become
higher than the node performing the black hole attack. Therefore, the threat level is less as compared
with the earlier one.
Based on the trust value of a malicious node, a node will quantize threat level (Hlevel) in
following way:
Hlevel =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
H1 (k ¡ 1) £
50¡g
k · Tmal · 50 ¡ g
H2 (k ¡ 2) £
50¡g
k · Tmal < (k ¡ 1) £
50¡g
k
. . .
. . .
Hk¡1
50¡g
k · Tmal < 2 £
50¡g
k
Hk 0 · Tmal <
50¡g
k
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
(6)
where k represents total number of threat levels, 50 ¡ g represent the upper limit of the untrustworthy
zone as deﬁned in Equation 3. Tmal represent the trust value of a malicious node. Let us assume that
there are three threat levels (k=3): low, medium and high. In that case, a node will quantize threat level
(Hlevel) in following way:
Hlevel =
8
> <
> :
Low 2 £
50¡g
3 · Tmal · 50 ¡ g
Medium
50¡g
3 · Tmal < 2 £
50¡g
3
High 0 · Tmal <
50¡g
3
9
> =
> ;
(7)
The concept of threat level is later used in our algorithm for a selection of an appropriate reliability level.
Phase 3: Generation of Alert Message
Once the threat level is assigned, a node will generate an alert/claim message. This message contains
four types of information.
1. Identity of the sender node (IDsender).
2. Identity of the malicious node (IDmal).
3. Threat level (Hlevel).Sensors 2009, 9 5998
4. Threat detail, like code etc.
This message will be forwarded to the other monitoring nodes.
5.2. Receiver Monitoring Node
Intrusion-aware alert validation algorithm at the receiver end is shown in Figure 4. It shows that, if
the claim packet is received from trustworthy monitoring node, then claim will be validated straightfor-
wardly. If the claim packet is received from the untrustworthy monitoring node, then no consideration
will be given to that claim packet. If the claim packet is received from the uncertain monitoring node,
then our proposed intrusion-aware validation algorithm goes through two phases: (1) consensus phase,
and (2) decision phase. Details about these phases are given below.
Figure 4. Intrusion-aware validation algorithm at the receiver end.
Phase 1 (Consensus Phase)
Whenever a designated node receives the claim/alert packet, it ﬁrst checks (1) if the sender is uncer-
tain, and (2) if the identity of a new malicious node is already declared as a malicious node (Algorithm
1, Line 1:2). If not, then the node will ﬁrst get the common neighborhood list (Nsm) of the sender and
malicious nodes respectively (Line 3:5). Afterwards, the node will perform ﬁltering by eliminating any
known malicious node(s) from that list (Line 6). Based on the threat level, conﬁrmation request packet(s)
is forwarded to randomly selected node(s) from the Nt list (Line 7:19). For example, if the threat level
is low, then the conﬁrmation request is forwarded to the one randomly selected trustworthy node fromSensors 2009, 9 5999
the list Nt (Line 8:9). If the threat level is medium, then the conﬁrmation request packet is forwarded to
half of the randomly selected trustworthy nodes from the list Nt (Line 10:13). If the threat level is high,
then the conﬁrmation request packet is forwarded to all trustworthy nodes in the list Nt (Line 14:17). If
the information about the malicious node is already present (Line 20), then the node will just update its
old record (Line 21).
Algorithm 1 Phase 1: Consensus Phase
1: Received Claim Packet (IDsender;IDmal;Hlevel,detail);
2: if IDsender is uncertain and IDmal is new then
3: Ns = GetNeighorList(IDsender);
4: Nm = GetNeighorList(IDmal);
5: Nsm = Ns
T
Nm;
6: Nt = Eliminate Known Malicious Nodes(Nsm);
7: if Nt 6= Á then
8: if ThreatLevel(THlevel) is Low then
9: Send conf req pkt(rand(Nt);IDmal;Hlevel,det);
10: else if ThreatLevel(THlevel) is Medium then
11: for i = 1 to len(Nt)=2 do
12: Send conf req pkt(rand(Nt);IDmal;Hlevel,det);
13: end for
14: else
15: for i = 1 to len(Nt) do
16: Send conf req pkt(IDi;IDmal,det);
17: end for
18: end if
19: end if
20: else
21: Update Record;
22: end if
Phase 2 (Decision Phase)
Once the conﬁrmation request packet(s) is forwarded to the particular node(s) then the phase 2 of the
validation algorithm is triggered. In this phase algorithm will ﬁrst wait for the conﬁrmation response
packets until ±t time, where ±t is calculated as:
±t = 2[2tprop + tproc] (8)
Here, tprop is the propagation time between the requester and farthest responder (in terms of hops or
geographicallocation)amongnodeswheretherequestpacketswereforwarded. The tproc istheestimated
processing time of the request at the responder end.Sensors 2009, 9 6000
A node will expect three types of responses (r) from the nodes where conﬁrmation request packets
were forwarded:
ri;j =
8
> <
> :
1 if agreewithclaim
0 if don0tknow
¡1 if notagreewithclaim
(9)
where ri;j represents that the node i received the response packet from the node j and j 2 Nt. A node i
will make the decision (D) about the validity and invalidity of the claim based on the following rule:
Di =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
validate i®
nres P
j=0
ri;j > 0
noconsensus i®
nres P
j=0
ri;j = 0
invalidate i®
nres P
j=0
ri;j < 0
(10)
where nres represents the total number of the response packets received by the node i in response to the
number of the request packets (nreq). Here 0 ¸ nres · nreq.
If the claim is invalidated, then the sender of the claim will declare it as a malicious node. That
helps to provide protection against any possible security threats, such as ﬂooding, denial of service
attacks, etc.
If no consensus is available, then the algorithm will decide based on its mode that is set by the
administrator. There are two types of modes: aggressive and defensive. If the algorithm is set in the
aggressive mode, then the node will validate the claim; if it is set in the defensive mode, then the node
will invalidate the claim.
Responder monitoring nodes: Whenever any monitoring node receives conﬁrmation request packet
for alert validation, it will ﬁrst check the status of the sender. If the sender is trusted, it will generate
conﬁrmation response packet and will not generate the same alert if responder node agree with the claim.
Also, the responder node will update its malicious node list. If the responder node receives the same alert
message from another monitoring node, it will straightforwardly validate that claim. This approach helps
to suppress any extra requests for the same alert.
Tolerance for false alarm: In our proposed algorithm, default tolerance level for false alarms gen-
erated by any node is zero. As mentioned earlier, if a claim is invalidated, the sender of the claim will
be declared as a malicious node. If we do not declare the sender as a malicious node, then it may result
in ﬂooding or denial of service attacks. However, if we declare the sender as a malicious node, it may
cause a node to be evicted from the network due to false alarm.
In order to solve the above problem, we can introduce a tolerance level metric in our algorithm.
Tolerance level determines the amount of trafﬁc each node can generate for the claims about which it is
unsure. Tolerance level will depend on network capacity and node abundance. It may also depend on the
energy level of the network. If the energy level is too low, the application can decide not to tolerate any
such trafﬁc.Sensors 2009, 9 6001
6. Analyses and Evaluation
6.1. Communication Overhead Analysis
The communication overhead of the validation algorithm is dependent on three factors: (1) total
number of intrusion claims (Ic), (2) number of commonly trusted neighboring nodes, and (3) threat level
of intrusion or anomaly. Table 2 shows the communication overhead, in which mt represents the average
number of trusted common neighboring nodes between the monitoring and malicious nodes and Il;Im,
and Ih represents the total number of low, medium and high intrusion level threats respectively. Here
Ic = Il + Im + Ih.
Table 2. Communication overhead of reliability modes.
Cost
Low 2Ic
Medium mtIc
High 2mtIc
Intrusion-aware 2Il + (Im + 2Ih)mt
Figure 5. Average communication overhead of validation algorithm after 1000 simulation
runs in which different levels of intrusions occurs randomly.
(a) Effect of mt and Ic (b) Comparison from reliability mode perspective
Figure 5 shows the average communication overhead (1,000 simulation runs) of the proposed vali-
dation algorithm. During the simulation, different levels (low, medium or high) of threats of anomalies
and intrusions occur randomly. Figure 6(a) shows the effect of average number of commonly trusted
neighboring nodes (between the monitoring and the malicious nodes) mt and the total number of intru-
sions Ic occurred in the network. It shows that as the number of mt or Ic increases, the communicationSensors 2009, 9 6002
overhead of the validation scheme also increases linearly. Figure 6(b) shows the comparison between
the four different levels of the reliability modes. In the simulation, each monitoring node has a random
number of commonly trusted neighboring nodes. This ﬁgure shows that the intrusion-aware reliability
mode introduces less communication overhead then the medium and high level reliability modes. At a
modest communication cost, it provides adequate reliability required by the nature of the intrusion claim.
Figure 6 shows the effect of tolerance level for false alarms on communication overhead. As we
mentioned earlier, the default tolerance level in our proposed scheme is zero. During simulation, we
introduce four tolerance levels (0–3) that occurred randomly. Figure 6 shows that as the number of mt
or Ic increases, the communication overhead of the validation scheme (with random tolerance) increases
more sharply as compared with the zero tolerance level.
Figure 6. Effect of false alarm tolerance factor on communication.
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6.2. Reliability Analysis
If we assume that the responding node have equal probability of sending any one of the three possible
responses (agree, disagree and don’t know), then the total probability (Pc) of a algorithm to reach at the
consensus state (validate or invalidate) is:
Pc =
Nc
Knres (11)
where Nc represents the number of nodes reaching a consensus and K represents the number of possible
outcomes (agree, disagree and don’t know) produces by the node. If the probability distribution is not
uniformbetweenpossibleoutcomes, thenthetotalprobability(Pc)ofanalgorithmtoreachtheconsensus
state (validates or invalidate) is:
Pc =
M P
m=1
(¦
nres
i=1 PMFi(Sm(i))) £ ±(m)
where M = Knres
(12)
where ±(m) is one if m node reaches the consensus, zero if otherwise. PMFi is the probability mass
function that captures the probability distribution of the symbol produced by the node i. Sm(i) is the ithSensors 2009, 9 6003
symbol in the mth node result. More details and derivation of these two probability equations are given
in [27].
Figure 7 shows the simulation result for the probability of reaching consensus (validate or invalidate)
of our validation algorithm. It shows that as the number of participating nodes increases in the consensus
process, the probability of reaching some consensus also increases linearly.
Figure 7. Probability of reaching at consensus and no consensus state.
6.3. Security Resiliency Analysis
Let’s denote the claimant node (the sender), let m denote the node accused of being malicious and let
a denote the node that receives this claim from s about m. As before, let Nt denote the ﬁltered list of
nodes obtained after performing Line 6 of the algorithm for the consensus phase. From a security point
of view, we consider 4 possible events:
1. Event S: s sends a true claim.
2. Event ¹ S: The complement of event S.
3. Event N: All nodes in Nt send correct responses.
4. Event ¹ N: A non-empty subset of nodes in Nt send incorrect responses.
Notice that there is no question of a behaving maliciously since the claim received by it is for its
own beneﬁt. Notice further that by incorrect response, we mean nodes responding with ¡1, where the
right answer should be either 1 or 0. Denote by M the event that a decides that m is malicious. We are
interested in the four resulting conditional probabilities. We calculate them sequentially in the following.
For the ease of analysis, we assume that if a comes to no consensus, it will take the claim of s as true.
Claim 1: Let m be the number of nodes in Nt that agree with the claim of s. Then Pr[MjS;N] =
¡Nt
m
¢Pm
i=1
(
Nt¡m
i )
2Nt¡m when m < Nt=2 and 1 otherwise.
Proof: First assume that m < Nt=2. The remaining nodes in Nt will either send ¡1 or 0 as the
response. Event M will be true if the sum of the ¡1’s is less than or equal to m. Assuming m to be ﬁxed,
this probability is:
Xm
i=1
¡Nt¡m
i
¢
2Nt¡mSensors 2009, 9 6004
Out of Nt nodes,
¡Nt
m
¢
is the total number of ways in which m nodes can agree with the claim. So the
probability is then: µ
Nt
m
¶Xm
i=1
¡Nt¡m
i
¢
2Nt¡m
The case when m ¸ Nt=2 is obvious.
¤
Claim 2: Let m0 be the number of nodes in Nt that send false responses. Let m be the number of
nodes in Nt that agree with the claim of s. Then Pr
£
MjS; ¹ N
¤
=
¡ Nt
m¡m0
¢Pm¡m0
i=1
(
Nt¡m+m0
i )
2Nt¡m+m0 when m ¸ m0
and 0 otherwise. In particular, Pr
£
MjS; ¹ N
¤
= 0 if m0 > Nt=2.
Proof: This is analogous to Claim 1, with the exception that now m has to be greater than at least
m0, since otherwise the sum of responses will be less than 0. Hence we replace m by m ¡ m0 in the
probability obtained from Claim 1. The special case when m0 > Nt=2 is obvious since then the sum of
the responses will always be less than 0.
¤
Claim 3: Pr
£
Mj¹ S;N
¤
= 1 ¡ Pr[MjS;N].
Proof: Since now the number of nodes that agree with s will play an opposite role, the result follows.
¤
Claim 4: Let m0 be the number of nodes in Nt that send false responses. Let m be the number
of nodes in Nt that agree with the claim of s. Then Pr
£
Mj¹ S; ¹ N
¤
=
¡ Nt
m+m0
¢Pm+m0
i=1
(
Nt¡m¡m0
i )
2Nt¡m¡m0 when
m + m0 < Nt=2 and 1 otherwise.
Proof: This is analogous to the proof of Claim 1. Notice that now there are a total number of m+m0
nodes that agree with s. Thus we simply replace m by m + m0 to complete the proof.
¤
Finally we look at the event when a marks s as malicious. This will happen if a comes to a consensus
opposite to the claim of s. Let this event be denoted as O. We are interested in Pr[OjS] and Pr
£
Oj¹ S
¤
.
Let p = Pr[N]. We have the following straightforward result:
Claim 5: We have:
Pr[OjS] = p(1 ¡ Pr[MjS;N]) + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ Pr
£
MjS; ¹ N
¤
)
Pr
£
Oj¹ S
¤
= p(1 ¡ Pr
£
Mj¹ S;N
¤
) + (1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ Pr
£
Mj¹ S; ¹ N
¤
)
The results that we obtain above are an upper bound on the adversary’s limitations. This analysis
provides a general probability method for the determination of certain security metric.Sensors 2009, 9 6005
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Existing cooperative-based distributed anomaly and intrusion detection schemes of WSNs do not
provide assurance that the reports/alerts/claims received by the other node(s) were really sent by the
trusted legitimate node(s). Therefore, in this paper we have proposed the ﬁrst validation algorithm for
trusting anomalies and intrusion claims. This algorithm uses the concept of an intrusion-aware reliability
parameter that helps to provide adequate reliability at a modest communication cost.
The proposed work is based on a few strict assumptions, i.e., multiple nodes can sense same anomaly
or intrusion. In practice, it is quite possible that only one node can detect some speciﬁc anomaly or
intrusion. Our proposed scheme does not adequetly deal with this case. Therefore, more work is needed
to make the proposed scheme further ﬂexible.
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